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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In response to a crime epidemic afflicting Latin America
since the early 1990s, several countries in the region have
resorted to using heavy-force police or military units to
physically retake territories de facto controlled by non-State
criminal or insurgent groups. After a period of territory
control, the heavy forces hand law enforcement functions in
the retaken territories to regular police forces, with the hope
that the territories and their populations will remain under
the control of the state. To a varying degree, intensity, and
consistency, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, and Jamaica have
adopted such policies since the mid-1990s.
During such operations, governments need to pursue two
interrelated objectives: to better establish the state’s physical
presence and to realign the allegiance of the population in
those areas toward the state and away from the non-State
criminal entities. From the perspective of law enforcement,
such operations entail several critical decisions and
junctions, such as:


Whether or not to announce the force insertion in
advance. The decision trades off the element of
surprise and the ability to capture key leaders of the
criminal organizations against the ability to minimize
civilian casualties and force levels. The latter,
however, may allow criminals to go to ground and
escape capture. Governments thus must decide
whether they merely seek to displace criminal groups
to other areas or maximize their decapitation
capacity.



Intelligence flows rarely come from the population.
Often, rival criminal groups arethe best source of
intelligence. However, cooperation between the State

and such groups that goes beyond using vetted
intelligence provided by the groups, such as a State
tolerance for militias, compromises the rule-of-law
integrity of the State and ultimately can eviscerate
even public safety gains.


Sustaining security after initial clearing operations is
at times even more challenging than conducting the
initial operations. Although unlike the heavy forces,
traditional police forces, especially if designed as
community police, have the capacity to develop trust
of the community and ultimately focus on crime
prevention, developing such trust often takes a long
time.



To develop the community’s trust, regular police
forces need to conduct frequent on-foot patrols with
intensive nonthreatening interactions with the
population and minimize the use of force. Moreover,
sufficiently robust patrol units need to be placed in
designated beats for substantial amount of time, often
at least over a year.



Establishing oversight mechanisms, including joint
police-citizens’ boards, further facilitates building
trust in the police among the community.



After the disruption of the established criminal order,
street crime often significantly rises and both the
heavy-force and community-police units often
struggle to contain it. The increase in street crime
alienates the population of the retaken territory from
the state. Thus developing a capacity to address street
crime is critical.
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Moreover, the community police units tend to be
vulnerable (especially initially) to efforts by
displaced criminals to reoccupy the cleared
territories. Losing a cleared territory back to criminal
groups is extremely costly in terms of losing any
established trust and being able to recover it. Rather
than operating on an a priori determined handover
schedule, a careful assessment of the relative strength
of regular police and the criminal groups postclearing operations is likely to be a better guide for
timing the handover from heavy forces to regular
police units.



Cleared territories often experience not only a peace
dividend, but also a peace deficit –in the rise new
serious crime (in addition to street crime).Newlyvaluable land and other previously-inaccessible
resources can lead to land speculation and forced
displacement; various other forms of new crime can
also significantly rise. Community police forces often
struggle to cope with such crime, especially as it is
frequently linked to legal businesses. Such new crime
often receives little to no attention in the design of
the operations to retake territories from criminal
groups. But without developing an effective response
to such new crime, the public safety gains of the
clearing operations can be altogether lost.
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INTRODUCTION
To an unprecedented degree, Latin Americans complain
about living in fear of crime. With the exception of
Colombia, criminal activity throughout the region has
exploded. Rates of violent crime are six times higher in Latin
America than in the rest of the world. 1 El Salvador
frequently ranks as one of the countries with the highest
murder rate in the world, with 57.3 per 100,000 in 2007. In
2006, Colombia’s murder rate was 42.8 per 100,000, and
Venezuela’s 36.4 per 100,000 in 2007, and Brazil’s 20.5 in
2008.2 Over 11,200 people died in drug-related violence in
Mexico in 2010.3 Kidnapping in the region is also frequent.
Organized crime is one of the principal sources of the
violence. But street crime also flourishes in the region and
frequently receives far less attention from the region’s
governments. Two decades of efforts to improve and reform
law-enforcement institutions in the region often have little to
show in improvements in public safety and accountability of
law enforcement.
1

See, for example, Jorge Sapoznikow et al., “Convivencia y Seguridad:
Un Reto a la Gobernabilidad” (Coexistence and Security: A Challenge to
Governability”, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC:
2000, and Centro Nacional de Datos, Fondelibertad, Ministrio de
Defensa Nacional, República de Colombia, “Cifras Extorsión” (Extortion
Rates), June 20, 2007; available from
www.antisecuestro.gov.co/documentos/7_16_2007_4_58_07_PM_Cifras
Historias.pdf, accessed May 17, 2008.
2
“Murder Rate Among Youths Soars in Brazil,” The Washington Post,
February 24, 2011. Since data collection, reporting mechanisms, and
strength of law enforcement varies greatly among Latin American
countries and many murders go unreported and undetected, there are
limits to the accuracy of the data. Moreover, data are not always
available for the same year for all countries.
3
“Ejecutómetro 2010” (Metrics of Execution 2010), Reforma, December
27, 2010; Grupo Reforma statistics cited in Transborder Institute, Justice
in Mexico News Report, August 2011, www.justiceinmexico.org.
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The response of Latin American countries to the crime
epidemic has varied. Some, such as in Central America, have
adopted the so-called mano dura (iron-fist) policies. Several
countries have ultimately resorted to using heavy-armed
police or outright military forces to retake territories with
weak state presence and essentially governed by criminal
groups or illegal militias (and in the case of Colombia, by an
insurgent group). This article presents some of the key law
enforcement lessons from retaking such urban spaces ruled
by criminal groups.
Brazil adopted such an approach in Sao Paolo and Rio de
Janeiro in the 2000s. Rio’s Pacification Policy (UPP) toward
the poor and crime-ridden favelas (slums) especially has
received widespread attention. In Mexico, President Felipe
Calderón deployed the military to Mexico’s streets to take
over law enforcement functions in many of the country’s
cities, including Ciudad Juárez and Tijuana. In Colombia’s
Medellín, the counterinsurgency and anti-crime policies in
the 2000s also follow similar patterns. President Álvaro
Uribe first sent the military to the city in 2002 to retake the
poor comunas ruled by the leftist guerrilla group the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (the FARC). That
allowed the crime lord-cum-paramilitary leader Don Berna
to consolidate his control over the criminal markets in the
city. In the latter part of the 2000s, Don Berna was
imprisoned and ultimately extradited to the United States.
The Tivoli Gardens neighborhood of Kingston, Jamaica has
been ruled for several decades by drug gangs linked to
Jamaica’s political parties, including since the 1990s by the
drug lord Christopher “Dudus” Coke. When in 2010 the
Jamaican Prime Minister Bruce Golding finally yielded to
U.S. pressure to arrest Coke and extradite him to the United
States, he resorted to sending a heavy force to the Tivoli
Garden in an operation that resembled more urban warfare
than a standard police arrest.
5

Between December 2009 and April 2011, I have conducted
fieldwork in all the places mentioned above, with the
exception of Jamaica. The goal of my research was to study
the design and effectiveness of the law enforcement
approaches adopted in those places. For that purpose, I
interviewed local government officials, police and military
officers, academics and think tank experts, NGO
representatives, journalists, residents of the poor
neighborhoods, and, when possible, also members of the
drug gangs and criminal groups operating in those areas. The
lessons presented below are derived from this fieldwork. For
the case of Jamaica, I rely on written analyses of other
scholars.
THE TWIN STATE-MAKING CHALLENGE
When dealing with urban areas pervaded by illicit economies
and violent criminality and inadequate State presence, where
organized non-State actors are present, the government
needs to pursue two interrelated objectives: First, it needs to
better establish its own physical presence. In some cases,
such as, for example, in Rio’s favelas, such an assertion (or
even insertion) of State authority may require retaking
territory that has been physically controlled by violent nonState entities. In other cases, establishing such presence may
entail demonstrating that the preponderance of physical
power, if not actually monopoly on violence, lies with the
State and its law enforcement apparatus.
Second, the government needs to realign the allegiance of
the population in those areas toward the State and away from
the non-State criminal entities. For that, its presence needs to
be not only robust, but also multifaceted and positive. In
urban areas of inadequate State presence, great poverty, and
social and political marginalization, large populations,
numbering in the tens of thousands to over a million, are
6

dependent on illicit economies, including the drug trade, for
economic survival and the satisfaction of their other socioeconomic needs. For many, participation in informal
economies, if not outright illegal ones, is the only way to
provide for their security and achieve social advancement,
even as they continue to exist in a trap of insecurity,
criminality, and marginalization. By sponsoring such illicit
economies and using proceeds from them to deliver
otherwise absent socio-economic goods and other public
goods, non-State entities, such as criminal gangs, drug
trafficking organizations, or urban militias, step into the
stateless void. Paradoxically, these non-State entities often
provide at least a modicum of security for the residents of the
areas they control. Yes, they are the sources of insecurity and
crime in the first place, but they often regulate the level of
violence, suppress street crime, such as robberies, thefts,
kidnapping, and even homicides. Their ability and
motivation to provide public goods varies, of course, but
such provision often takes place regardless of whether the
non-State entities are politically-motivated actors or criminal
enterprises.4 This explains how even non-ideological
criminal groups can obtain and enjoy a great degree of
political capital.5The more they deliver order, security, and
economic goods, the more they become de facto proto-State
governing entities.
Obtaining trust and allegiance of the community is
frequently a complex task that requires appropriate policies
4

For some of the dimensions of how such delivery of public goods by
non-State entities varies, see Vanda Felbab-Brown, Shooting Up:
Counterinsurgency and the War on Drugs (Washington, DC: The
Brookings Institution, 2009).
5
For details, see, Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Human Security and Crime in
Latin America: The Political Capital and Political Impact of Criminal
Groups and Belligerents Involved in Illicit Economies,” (WHEMSAC
Monograph, Florida International University, Applied Research Center,
September 2011).
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and time. If the community had previously experienced
primarily negative manifestations of the State -- such as
violent repression against criminal groups, suppression of
illegal economies but no provision of legal livelihoods, or
social stigmatization -- it will be deeply mistrustful of greater
State presence.
Efforts to pacify violent and neglected urban areas thus
parallel
many
aspects
of
population-centric
counterinsurgency. Drawing such a parallel can be politically
very sensitive in Latin America, where allusions to
counterinsurgency (COIN) policy can conjure up vivid and
painful memories of the region’s anticommunist
counterinsurgency campaigns. However, the realization that
some policies to combat urban violence mimic aspects of
population-centric COIN policies does not imply that the
State that faces violent urban challenges has failed. It does
indicate that COIN and consolidation policies in places, such
as Colombia or even more distant and very different locales,
such as Afghanistan and Pakistan, may nonetheless provide
some important lessons.
RETAKING TERRITORY
In all the cases listed above, the government ultimately
resolved that it had to physically “retake” the problematic
urban space from non-State entities. In many of the cases,
the government adopted such a policy only after other
measures had been applied, often over many decades, such
as physically blocking off and then ignoring the festering
areas, negotiating multiple iterations of modus vivendi with
the non-State entities controlling the urban space, or buying
them off with political handouts.
When retaking or clearing operations have been employed
since the 1990s in Latin America, these have usually
8

involved the insertion of “special” forces to supplement or at
least temporarily replace regular police forces deemed to be
too incompetent or corrupt to redress the levels of violent
criminality that plague the community. Such physical
retaking of urban space may have different connotations in
different urban contexts: In Rio de Janeiro, the police had
often been physically blocked off by the drug gangs from
entering the favelas and, apart from highly violent raids into
the poor neighborhoods, remained altogether absent. In the
slums of Sao Paolo, the police were not as completely denied
entry, but their presence consisted merely of sporadic and
ineffective patrols. In the colonias of Ciudad Juárez, the
police, although present to some extent, still were ineffective
and unmotivated to roll back the control of the Drug
Trafficking Organizations.
What Clearing Means: Arrests?
The underlying concept of the clearing operations is that
either military forces or SWAT-type police forces retake the
urban spaces from criminal groups and then, after a period of
time of suppressing the local non-State entities, hand law
enforcement responsibilities for the urban spaces back to
regular police forces. To the extent that military forces in
particular are deployed, they need to be deployed with a very
clear operational mandate as to their specific task in the
clearing operations: Are they supposed to merely protect
police forces, with the latter remaining in charge of arrests
and investigations? Are they only to patrol the streets, on the
assumption that such patrols will reduce the violence, or are
they also mandated to capture designated high-value targets?
Not specifying the military’s role to such a detailed level
will limit the effectiveness of its operations and complicate
interagency cooperation. Mexico since 2006 provides ample
examples of such problems with an underspecified mandate
9

for the use of military forces for domestic law enforcement
operations.6
A primary question that needs to be answered in preparing
such a clearing operation is whether or not to announce the
force insertion in advance. Announcing the raid in advance,
as for example the government of Jamaica did when it finally
decided to arrest Christopher “Dudus” Coke, can be an
important mechanism for mitigating violence levels, limiting
collateral damage, and minimizing other harms to the
community.7 For example, advance warning can allow
citizens to escape the crossfire by moving out of town for the
duration of the operation. (Such population displacements
even when actually temporary entail their own tough
consequences and costs.) Prior announcements of clearing
operations may also enhance the transparency of law
enforcement actions, an outcome that can be a building block
toward constructing the community’s trust in the
government. Such transparency can be particularly important
in areas where previous police incursions have been highly
violent and brutal. And the early warning may deter the
criminal gangs from resisting the law enforcement actions,
once they appreciate the full scope and preponderance of
State power they will face.
However, such announcements come with costs. They can
allow the criminal groups to dig in and develop defenses,
preventing law enforcement forces from being able to
6

See, Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Addressing Organized Crime, Drug
Trafficking, and Violence in Mexico: Lessons from Tijuana, Ciudad
Juárez, and Michoacán,” section “Ciudad Juárez and the Evolution of
Mexico’s Security Policy,” Brookings Institution, September 2011.
7
For details on Jamaica’s drug gangs, their relationship to political
parties, and the 2010 operation to arrest Coke, see Desmond Arias, “The
Impact of Organized Crime on Governance and Statebuilding,” Center
for International Cooperation, New York University, forthcoming Dec.
2011.
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capitalize on the element of surprise. Such surprise often
critically facilitates capturing key leaders of criminal groups.
Even worse, it can induce members of the criminal groups to
melt into the population or move to other areas for the
duration of specialized forces presence. Government forces
may find it extraordinarily difficult to sift through
population, identify members of the criminal gangs, and
locate its reputed leaders –especially where members of the
criminal gangs come from the community, enjoy at least a
degree of its support, and have a superior knowledge of the
local urban terrain. Because the criminal organizations may
have accumulated substantial political capital with the local
population and because the population may fear violent
reprisals for cooperating with law enforcement forces, the
local population often tends to be extremely reluctant to
provide actionable intelligence that can lead to the arrest of
key leaders. Thus, Brazil’s BOPE forces, as the heavilyequipped military-like police forces there are known, had to
struggle to identify and arrest gang members during the
clearing operations in Sao Paolo and in Rio, even though the
BOPE tried to interrogate virtually every single male in some
of the retaken shantytowns and impose population controls.
When the local population provides intelligence at all, it is
usually in areas where a gang had previously alienated the
community through the use of violence that surpasses typical
norms in the area.
Accordingly, policymakers need to carefully assess, on a
case-by-case basis, the extent to which not announcing an
operation in advance will facilitate making arrests that
critically weaken the criminal groups and can help anchor
State presence in the community. Such assessments need to
consider how easy it is for the criminal groups to generate
new effective leadership and how much the government’s
own violent tactics will alienate the community from the
state. The fact that someone is the number one or two or
11

three in a criminal group does not mean that arresting him
(or her, in some cases) would result in the collapse of the
criminal group. Many so-called high-value targets (HVTs)
should rather be thought of as high-visibility targets instead
of having a real interdiction value in the sense that their
arrests will severely limit the regeneration and leadership
capacity of the criminal group. Historically, criminal groups
have been able to replace their captured leaders rather easily,
far more so than terrorist groups. Mexico has been learning
this painful lesson over the past five years.
Who Provides Intelligence?
Frequently, intelligence flows during clearing operations
come from rival criminal groups or militias. In Tijuana, for
example, during the military operations in the late 2000s, the
Sinaloa DTO allegedly was particularly effective in taking
advantage of the government-installed hotline to provide
information on its rivals. 8 In Medellín in the early 1990s, the
Cali cartel and Los Pepes, a militia precursor to the later
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) paramilitary
forces, provided critical intelligence on Pablo Escobar’s
Medellín cartel and physically cooperated with Colombia’s
security forces in the Medellín cartel’s destruction.9 In a
similar way, Medellín crime lord Don Berna cooperated with
the Colombian military in destroying the presence of the
FARC in the city in 2002. It would be foolish of course not
to take advantage of such intelligence flows, especially as
other criminal entities may have far superior knowledge of
8

See, Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Addressing Organized Crime, Drug
Trafficking, and Violence in Mexico: Lessons from Tijuana, Ciudad
Juárez, and Michoacán,” section “The Tijuana Law Enforcement Model
and Its Limitations,” Brookings Institution, September 2011.
9
For details, see Vanda Felbab-Brown, “The Violent Drug Market in
Mexico and Lessons from Colombia,” Brookings Institution, March
2009,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2009/03_mexico_dru
g_market_felbabbrown/03_mexico_drug_market_felbabbrown.pdf.
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the targeted criminal group than the government. However,
intelligence from such sources needs to be very carefully
vetted.
Moreover, relying on or sanctioning the physical actions of
criminal groups or militias against other violent non-State
entities tend to come with severe costs for the state and
society. Both in Colombia and in Rio de Janeiro, where such
groups emerged in the 2000s, the militias’ ability to deliver
real security was limited. They often repressed the rival
criminal or insurgent group only as much as was necessary
to minimally satisfy their State or business sponsors and they
turned out to be extremely abusive toward the community.
They took over various forms of extortion and criminal
activity and provided even fewer public goods and services
to the marginalized community than did the criminal or
insurgent entities they displaced. Even when the Colombian
State or the Rio de Janeiro municipal authorities and
business elite found themselves less threatened by the new
criminal order, the community in the marginalized urban
space often suffered greater physical abuse and socioeconomic privation than before.
Moreover, apart from the inherent violations of the rule of
law and citizens’ human rights, the control of such actors
presents a huge challenge to the State. Since the late 2000s in
Medellín, for example, even after Don Berna was extradited
to the United States, the remnants of his criminal militias
have physically targeted ex-FARC combatants who have
gone through the reintegration process sponsored by the
Colombian government, de facto preventing them from
living in Medellín and undermining the government’s
security policy.10 In Mexico in the 1980s and 1990s, the
DTOs managed by the government’s law enforcement
agencies were able to corrupt and completely eviscerate
10

Author’s interviews in Medellín, January 2011.
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these agencies.11 More often than not, places as diverse as
Medellín, Ciudad Juárez, Mogadishu, and Karachi have
learned that the State-tolerated militias/criminal groups over
time start disobeying their political and State overlords. At
times, they even try to become the powerholders dictating
the terms of business and politics.
What Clearing Means: Displacement of Criminals?
Displacement of criminal groups to other areas is also costly.
Often the State lacks the capacity to inject sufficient law
enforcement forces to all areas. Instead of achieving an
spreading ink-spot of security (with the zone of effective
public safety steadily expanding), clearing operations may
essentially amount to a shell game, with violent criminality
and its associated social ills moving to other areas of weak
state presence. To an important degree, such displacement is
taking place in Rio de Janeiro under the current UPP policy,
for example, with violent criminal gangs and violent criminal
enterprises relocating from the favelas near the city center to
the southern outskirts of the city.
Even if only a relocation of the criminals is taking place, the
State may prefer such an outcome if the clearing operations
retake a particularly strategic area, such as a city center.
Since city centers tend to be areas where business elites
operate and sometimes live, the State may have some
legitimate reasons to prioritize such areas. If the urban
business elite decide to move away, as is, for example,
happening in Acapulco today, such an exodus may lead to a
brain drain and capital fight. That can in turn undermine both
the administrative capacity of local authorities and the legal
economy and hence, job generation and fiscal revenues of
the city. Insecure business elites who enjoy important
political power may be particularly effective advocates of the
use of heavy-handed, human-rights-insensitive crime
14

suppression measures, such as the various mano dura
approaches that have proliferated around Latin America.
Business elites may also be highly motivated and tend to be
well-positioned to sponsor illegal militias that go beyond
private security companies. Such extralegal “anti-crime”
groups generate their own criminality, deeply undermine
citizens’ security, and weaken the Sate in the long run. Thus
enhancing public safety in the city center may be a wellplaced priority for the State. But without a credible plan to
expand public safety provision to less privileged citizens and
areas beyond the city center, merely pacifying the city center
is insufficient. In the worst outcome, the government’s
actions can spread violent criminality without achieving
adequate improvement anywhere.
Sustaining Security
The other serious consequence of allowing criminals to
temporarily go to ground as a result of announcing clearing
operations in advance is that when the heavy police forces
leave the retaken territory, the regular police forces may not
be able to hold the territory. The regular police forces may
be unable able to cope with a highly violent effort on the part
of the criminal groups to take the territory. For example,
since the BOPE forces left Cidade de Deus, one of Rio’s
famous favelas and one of the first to be treated to the UPP
policy, and security there was transferred to the UPP
community police, rumors have circulated several times that
the Comando Vermelho gang was massing forces to push out
the UPP police and reoccupy the favela. Although
fortunately such a takeover has not materialized, the mere
rumors have frightened the community sufficiently to limit
extensive cooperation with the government.12
Even if criminals are pushed out from the city center to the
outskirts or if a cordon sannitaire can be established around
12

Author’s interviews in Rio de Janeiro, January 2010.
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selected strategic areas, the effects of insecurity in the
outskirts, such as from extortion driving legal enterprises out
of businesses, may leak back into the city center,
undermining security achievements in the prioritized zones.
Thus the selection of what problematic urban areas will be
selected for law enforcement action needs to be guided by a
strong focus on the sustainability of the security to be
provided in those spaces, rather than, for example, on the
basis of the intensity of violence in an area or its electoral
significance.
The insertion of heavy police or outright military force
almost always tends to be temporary –for two basic reasons:
First, the State often lacks sufficient numbers of such forces
to cover all the areas in-need with a sufficiently-high troop
density to achieve preponderance of power. Second, the
heavy-handed use of force has other important shortcomings
– in terms of civil liberties and human rights protection, but
also in terms of developing local intelligence. Even when
actually subject to substantial human rights training, a rare
occurrence for heavy police and military forces in Latin
America, the SWAT forces are built specifically to project
great force. For that reason and because their personnel are
alien to the retaken community, they often have to struggle
to establish trust, develop deep knowledge of the
community, and generate local intelligence.
Timing the Handover
Timing the handover to regular police forces -- ideally,
community police -- however, is complex. In some cases,
such as in the Sao Paolo operations, the BOPE forces were
inserted into the shantytowns with a specific timetable: they
were expected to be present for about eight weeks after
which law enforcement would be handed over to regular
police forces. In other places, such as in Ciudad Juárez, the
duration of the deployment of the military forces was not
16

specified in advance. However, the departure of the military
forces from Ciudad Juárez was driven far more by a negative
reaction of the residents to the excesses of the military forces
and by the failure of the military forces to reduce violence
levels in the city, than by their success in doing so. If the
heavy forces are pulled out prematurely and the cleared area
is again retaken by violent criminal entities, the ability of the
State to generate trust in its law enforcement a second time
around will be greatly undermined. Rather than operating on
an a priori determined handover schedule, a careful
assessment of the criminal groups’ strength remaining after
clearing operations and of the capacity of regular police
forces is likely to be a better guide for the handover.
However, the goal should be to minimize the duration,
extent, and lethality of the heavy forces as much as possible.
Establishing the Local Community’s Trust
Unlike heavy-force law enforcement units, regular police
forces, especially if designed as community police, can have
the capacity to develop the trust of and support from the
local population. Thus they potentially have the capacity to
move away from crime suppression solely toward crime
prevention. However, for them to develop such capacity,
they need to solve intelligence problems that are different
from those of units designed for the capture of high-value
criminal targets. Instead of having the vetted, insulated and
small intelligence units needed for the latter, community
police forces need to have a permanent and widespread
presence within the community. They need to conduct
frequent, often on-foot patrols. A permanent police station
in an urban slum where the police play cards inside the
station and rarely venture outside among the slum residence
will not be able to develop much local knowledge and
intelligence capacity.
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Moreover, sufficiently robust patrol units need to be placed
in designated beats for substantial amount of time, often at
least over a year. Without a robust presence, without a
sufficient density of police officers per neighborhood, the
beat patrols will feel vulnerable and may be tempted to
retreat to the police station. Concentrating police resources,
including police patrol presence, may well be politically
difficult, but it is necessary.
In order to get to know the criminals, the local police patrols
need to get to know the community and interact with it
frequently and in a nonthreatening manner. The UPP forces
in Rio de Janeiro have been operating under such guidelines,
and at least in some “pacified” favelas have been began
developing the trust of the community. 13Colombia too has
been unveiling an urban policing plan built upon such
principles, called Plan Nacional de Vigiliancia Comunitaria
por Cuadrantes; but it is too early to assess the effectiveness
of the policy.
Establishing Oversight Mechanisms
Apart from having a sufficient density of police officers and
sufficient intensity of nonthreatening interactions with the
community, establishing the trust of the local community
also requires setting up oversight and accountability
mechanisms of police forces. Such mechanisms include
establishing joint citizen-police boards that allow experts and
community representatives to provide input to law
enforcement and mandating reporting and careful
examination of violent police actions. In Great Britain or the
United States, for example, police officers often have to file
a report every time they discharge their weapons.

13

Author’s interviews in the Babylonia favela in Rio de Janeiro,
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Standing Up Community Police Forces
Standing up police forces takes time. In the United States,
regular police officers, for example, receive at least six
months of training. In Mexico, where police reform is a
major component of the security overhaul, many police
officers receive only eight weeks of training. The quality of
training – from how to handle a weapon to respect for human
rights – also matters critically as does the post-training
standard operating procedures and leadership of the units
into which new recruits are placed. Even under auspicious
circumstances, effective police reform often requires a
decade: essentially a generation of officers needs to be
promoted from beat cops to key leadership positions and
commitment to police reform needs to be sustained during
that period at all levels of the police hierarchy.
Conducting police reform during times of intense and highly
violent criminal activity tends to be particularly problematic.
Law enforcement becomes overwhelmed and its energies
preoccupied with responding to crime (and sometimes even
hanging on for dear life) and diverted away from reforms.
Thus, if some urban areas register a decline in violent crime,
the State needs to take advantage of such opportunities to
deepen and strengthen police reform. Such an opportunity
should not be missed even if such a decline in criminal
violence came as a result of a truce among the criminal
entities.
HOLDING AND TACKLING “NEW” CRIME
Apart from preserving and enlarging the security generated
by suppression of the previous criminal groups of the
marginalized urban areas, the regular police forces also need
to be able to suppress the street crime and new organized
crime that are likely to emerge in the “pacified” areas. The
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destruction of the previous criminal order does not mean that
a benevolent crime-free order emerges in its wake.
Often, criminal groups function as security providers
(suboptimal as they are), regulating and punishing theft,
robberies, extortions, rapes and murders and dispensing their
rules and punishments for transgressions. The removal of the
criminal gangs often results in a rise of street crime that can
become a critical nuisance to the community and discredit
the presence of the State and its law enforcement. That has in
fact been the case in both Medellín in the post-Don Berna
order as well as in the pacified favelas of Rio.14Especially in
areas where police have been trained as light
counterinsurgency forces (in Latin America, unlike South
Asia, this is more often a problem in rural areas rather than
in urban spaces) they may be undertrained, under-resourced,
and not focused on addressing street crime. Even
community-policing forces may have little capacity to
undertake criminal investigations that lead to meaningful
prosecution, yet police units specialized in criminal
investigations may continue to be too far away and have
limited access to a pacified urban space to conduct
investigations that reduce street crime. Providing training to
community police forces for tackling at least some street
crime and streamlining and facilitating the presence of
specialized criminal investigation units, such as homicide
squads and prosecutors, are of critical importance for
improving public safety for the community and for
anchoring State presence in the pacified areas.
Under some circumstances, law enforcement actions against
the governing criminal entity may give rise to intense turf
warfare among other criminal groups over the spoils of the
criminal market. After Don Berna was extradited to the
14

Author’s interviews in Rio de Janeiro, January 2010 and Medellín,
February 2011.
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United States, for example, many criminal gangs in and
around Medellín, including two large ones led by Sebastian
and Valenciano, began fighting each other over smuggling
routes, local drug distribution, prostitution enterprises, and
protection rackets. The turf war triggered extensive violence,
including homicide rates in over 100per 100,000 in the late
2000s and on par with those before the FARC was defeated
in the city, and Don Berna established his “narcopeace”.15Similarly in Mexico, law enforcement actions
against established DTOs triggered intense violence among
splinter groups and new gangs, such as in the Mexican state
of Michoacán where interdiction operations against La
Familia Michoacana have given rise to Los Templarios. That
criminal gang has since been battling with Los Zetas, another
of Mexican DTOs originating as splinter group, over control
of criminal markets in the state. Such turf wars can
compromise the physical and economic security of local
communities far more than even the previous criminal order.
In some circumstances, an urban area to which State
presence has been extended may even suffer a peace deficit.
Along with or instead of the hoped-for peace dividend of
legal businesses moving into the urban space and providing
legal jobs and income, the new areas may be attractive as a
source of new land to be taken over by nefarious land
developers. Such demands for land in the newly “pacified”
urban areas may generate new forced land displacement,
instead of benevolent gentrification. In rural spaces, the
cause of such new illegal displacement may be the presence
of profitable resources, such as gold, coal, and others, or the
agricultural potential of the land, such as for African oil palm
plantations. In urban spaces, housing development and real
15

Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Reducing Urban Violence: Lessons from
Medellín, Colombia,” The Brookings Institution, February 14, 2011,
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0214_colombia_crime_felbabb
rown.aspx.
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estate speculation may well drive such illegal displacement.
Competition over State resources inserted to “pacified”
areas, such as for socio-economic development, may
generate new temptations of illegal behavior. Militias or new
criminal groups seeking to set up new protection rackets and
usurp the inserted State resources may well emerge. Many
urban spaces in Colombia suffer from such old-new
criminality today, as they have historically.
Local community forces, even while effective at keeping the
old criminals out, may not have the capacity to prevent such
nefarious activities cloaked as legal development. At the
same time, criminal units specializing in white-collar
organized crime and asset expropriation are often located in
the city center of a State capital far away from the “pacified”
slums and may be paying little attention to such phenomena
in the newly-liberated spaces. Moreover, since such land
takeover and asset expropriation may well be linked to legal
and politically-powerful developers, municipal authorities
may lack the motivation to pay close attention to such
criminal developments in the “pacified” urban areas.
Yet without diligent and concerted law enforcement actions
against such new crime, the benefits of the complex and
costly State interventions in the marginalized urban areas
may be altogether lost. Instead of addressing the causes of
illegal economies and violent organized crime by
strengthening effective and accountable State presence, the
State intervention may ultimately only alter the manifestation
of illegality and displace existing problems to other areas.
Not only criminality and criminal gangs, but also the
marginalized residents of the urban shantytowns themselves
may merely be forced out to other slums.
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CONCLUSIONS
Several key elements determine the effectiveness of law
enforcement operations to retake urban spaces governed by
violent non-State entities: the ability to develop intelligence
for arrests of critical operators of the criminal groups and
evidence for their effective prosecution, the ability to
develop trust of the local community, such as by minimizing
violence and establishing community police units, the ability
to effectively address street and new organized crime likely
to emerge post clearing operations, and the ability to sustain
security after the heavy-force units depart. Apart from these
modalities of the actual law enforcement operation, the
success of increasing public safety in problematic urban
neighborhoods cannot be divorced from the capacity to
provide effective and speedy dispute resolution mechanisms
and access to the justice system in the “pacified” spaces.
Ultimately, an effective State strategy toward organized
crime is not merely one of law enforcement suppression of
crime. Law enforcement plays a critical and indispensible
role; it is the founding block of establishing effective State
presence. But an appropriate response toward dealing with
marginalized urban spaces is ultimately a multifaceted statebuilding strategy that seeks to strengthen the bonds between
the State and marginalized communities.
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